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Abstract: This paper reviews the methods and technologies for congestion pricing of roads. Congestion 
tolls can be implemented at scales ranging from individual lanes on single links to national 
road networks. Tolls can be differentiated by time of day, road type and vehicle 
characteristics, and even set in real time according to current traffic conditions. Conventional 
toll booths have largely given way to electronic toll collection technologies. The main 
technology categories are roadside-only systems employing digital photography, tag and 
beacon systems that use short-range microwave technology, and in vehicle-only systems 
based on either satellite or cellular network communications. The best technology choice 
depends on the application. The rate at which congestion pricing is implemented, and its 
ultimate scope, will depend on what technology is used and on what other functions and 
services it can perform. Since congestion pricing calls for the greatest overall degree of toll 
differentiation, congestion pricing is likely to drive the technology choice. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Traffic congestion is common in large cities and on major highways and it imposes a significant 
burden in lost time, uncertainty, and aggravation for passenger and freight transportation. The 
European UNITE project estimated the costs of traffic congestion in the UK to be ₤15 billion/yr. 
or 1.5% of GDP (Nash et al., 2003). For France and Germany the estimates were 1.3% and 0.9% 
of GDP respectively. The Texas Transportation Institute conducts an annual survey of traffic 
congestion in major US cities. According to the 2009 report, in 2007 congestion caused an 
estimated 4.2 billion hours of travel delay and 2.8 billion gallons of extra fuel consumption with 
a total cost of $87 billion (Schrank and Lomax, 2009). 
Most of the costs of traffic congestion are borne by travelers collectively, but because 
individual travelers impose delays on others they do not pay the full marginal social cost of their 
trips and therefore create a negative externality. The standard economic prescription to 
internalize the costs of a negative externality is a Pigouvian tax. In the first edition of his 
textbook, The Economics of Welfare, Pigou (1920) himself argued for a tax on congestion and 
thereby launched the literature on congestion pricing. Most economists have supported 
congestion pricing although many have been concerned about the details of implementation 
(Lindsey, 2006). Congestion pricing has a big advantage over other travel demand management 
policies in that it encourages individuals and firms to adjust all aspects of their behaviour: 
number of trips, destination, mode of transport, time of day, route, and so on, as well as their 
long-run decisions on where to live, work and set up business. 
For decades congestion pricing remained largely an ivory-tower idea, but interest gradually 
spread outside academia and congestion pricing has come into limited practice. The main 
operating schemes are High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane facilities in the US, the London 
Congestion Charge, the Stockholm cordon charge1, and Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing 
system. Few cost-benefit analyses of these (or other) congestion pricing systems have been 
undertaken. However, the limited evidence suggests that well-designed schemes can yield 
significant net economic benefits. Small et al. (2006) estimate the benefits from tolling a two-
                                                 
1 According to Swedish law the congestion charge is a tax, but it will called a charge or toll in this review. 
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lane facility similar to the State Route 91 (SR-91) HOT lanes in Orange County, California. 2 
Optimal tolling of both lanes yields a welfare gain of nearly $3 per trip, while operating one lane 
as a HOT lane and leaving the other lane free yields a still appreciable gain of $2.25 per trip. 
The London Congestion Charge has been closely monitored since it was introduced in 2003. 
The fifth annual report (Transport for London, 2007) estimated the gross annual benefits of the 
original scheme at £200 million ($326 million)3 and the total costs at £88 million ($143 million), 
resulting in a net benefit of £112 million ($183 million) and a benefit-cost ratio of 2.27.4 
Stockholm’s congestion charge began as a seven-month Trial in 2007 and, after a successful 
referendum, became permanent in 2007. Based on results of the Trial, Eliasson (2009) estimated 
the annual benefits net of operating costs to be about SEK 650 million/year ($92 million) and 
investment and startup costs of about 1.9 billion SEK ($268 million) yielding a social surplus 
pay-off time of only four years. Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing has not been put to a 
comprehensive cost-benefit test, but the system is widely held up as a successful model. 
The Netherlands is developing a national distance-based system of tolls to control congestion 
and emissions and several other countries are also considering national schemes — in part to 
internalize congestion and other traffic externalities. However, despite the apparent success of 
existing schemes, and plans to establish more, congestion pricing continues to be a hard sell. 
Several major proposals have recently been scuttled by public or political opposition. Cordon 
tolling schemes for Edinburgh and Manchester were rejected by public referenda in 2005 and 
2008, respectively. An online petition to the UK government in early 2007 attracted more than 
1.8 million signatures against road pricing, and effectively put an end to plans for a national 
                                                 
2 HOT lanes run in parallel with lanes that are not tolled. High Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs) can use the 
HOT lanes without paying. The occupancy requirement is usually either two people (HOV2+) or three 
people (HOV3+) as on SR-91. 
3 This information is taken from Santos (2008).Throughout the paper foreign currency amounts are 
converted to US dollars at August 29, 2009 exchange rates. 
4 The congestion charging zone was extended to the west in 2007. In an ex ante analysis Santos and 
Fraser (2006) determined that the Western Extension fails a cost-benefit test. To the best of our 
knowledge an in medias res cost-benefit analysis of the extension has yet to be done. 
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scheme in the UK for the time being. And a cordon toll plan for New York City was stopped by 
the New York state legislature in April 2008 when it declined to vote on the proposal. 
These setbacks illustrate the difficulties of designing congestion pricing schemes that are 
both efficient and publicly acceptable. Much has been written recently about road pricing in 
general, and congestion pricing in particular, and it is useful to delineate the bounds of this 
review as well as to provide a few references for material that is not covered. As the title of the 
review indicates, it concerns ways in which traffic congestion pricing can be implemented and 
the technologies available for doing so. Considerable attention is given to comprehensive 
distance-based pricing because it appears to offer substantial potential benefits while also posing 
considerable technological challenges. 
Due to space limitations a number of topics related to traffic congestion pricing are excluded 
from the review including parking congestion and parking pricing5, pricing of road emissions6, 
the use of congestion pricing revenues7, and the role of congestion tolls in guiding efficient 
investments.8 Slot-based reservation systems in which drivers book trips in advance are ignored9 
as are pricing instruments that may reduce congestion but are not designed to do so such as fuel 
taxes, vehicle ownership taxes, vehicle registration fees, and Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) 
insurance10. Public-choice and other institutional considerations are mentioned only 
incidentally.11 
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the 
theory of congestion pricing with an emphasis on practical complications. Section 3 describes 
                                                 
5 See Shoup (2005), Arnott et al. (2005, Chapter 2) and Arnott (2009). 
6 See Johansson-Stenman and Sterner (1998) and Jensen-Butler et al. (2008). 
7 See De Palma et al. (2007). 
8 See Small and Verhoef (2007, Chapter 5). 
9 See Wong (1997). 
10 See Proost and Van Dender (1998), Parry (2005), and Bordoff and Noel (2008). 
11 Governance is discussed by Sorensen and Taylor (2005), the potential role of the private sector in 
building and operating toll roads by Gómez-Ibáñez and Meyer (1993) and Small (2008), public 
acceptability by Schade and Schlag (2003), and equity by Ecola and Light (2009). 
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methods of congestion pricing as defined by network coverage and how tolls are differentiated 
by time of day, type of road, and other dimensions. Section 4 describes technologies that are 
used, or being tested, for congestion pricing and reviews their strengths and weaknesses. 
Concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
2 THEORY OF CONGESTION PRICING 
Although this review is primarily concerned with the methods and technologies for congestion 
pricing it is useful to begin by summarizing the theory in order to identify the functional 
requirements of an effective congestion pricing scheme.12 Following Walters (1961) consider 
first a single road link. Let Q denote flow on the link measured in vehicles per hour, and ( )c Q  
the generalized cost of a trip on the link (i.e. vehicle operating cost plus travel time cost). The 
total cost of Q trips per hour is then ( )TC c Q Q= , the marginal social cost of a trip is 
( ) ( )MSC dTC dQ c Q c Q Q′= = + , and the marginal external cost is ( )MEC MSC c Q= −  
( )c Q Q′= . The Pigouvian toll is therefore ( )c Q Qτ ′= . 
The Pigouvian toll formula for a single link extends to each link of a road network if all links 
can be tolled efficiently. Let a denote a link (or arc) in the network, aQ  be the flow on link a, 
and ( )a ac Q  be the generalized travel cost on link a which is assumed to be independent of flows 
on other links. As Yang and Huang (1998) show, the Pigouvian toll on link a is simply 
( )a a a ac Q Qτ ′= , a A∈ , where A is the set of all links. The toll is a function of flow on the link, 
but it is independent of travel conditions on other links so that only local information is required 
to set the toll. Moreover, because tolls are link-based rather than path-based, information is not 
required about the paths that vehicles follow through the network. This is advantageous in terms 
of both practicality and privacy since there is no need to track trip origins, destinations, or routes. 
The simple Pigouvian theory bypasses many complications that have led to a rich and still 
expanding literature, but also make practical applications much more challenging than the simple 
                                                 
12 More comprehensive reviews of the theory are found in Lindsey and Verhoef (2001), Small and 
Verhoef (2007, Chapter 4), Parry (2008), and Tsekeris and Voß (2008). 
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theory might suggest. Only some of the more important complications will be identified here.13 
One complication is evident in the single-link formulation from the equilibrium condition that 
the marginal willingness to pay for a trip equal the cost inclusive of the toll; i.e. 
( ) ( )p Q c Q τ= + , where ( )p  is the inverse demand function. To solve for the optimal toll, 
( )c Q Qτ ′= , it is necessary to solve for the equilibrium value of Q when the toll is applied. This 
requires knowledge of the inverse demand function as well as the link speed-flow curve and the 
value of travel time (VOT) that underlie the trip cost function ( )c . Despite decades of research, 
identifying the speed-flow curve is not straightforward — in part because it varies from link to 
link with lane width, horizontal and vertical alignments and curvature, traffic-control measures 
and other factors. The relevant VOT is also not a single number but rather an average that 
depends on the composition of users which in turn varies with the level of the toll, by time of 
day, and other factors. Values of time can also depend on trip duration, and there is evidence that 
VOTs are higher under congested than uncongested travel conditions (Calfee and Winston, 1998; 
Santos and Bhakar, 2006; Hensher and Puckett, 2008). 
A second complication is that the congestion externality a vehicle imposes depends on its 
size, acceleration and braking capabilities, and maneuverability. These factors are typically 
accounted for by using a Passenger Car Equivalent (PCE) factor (Transportation Research 
Board, 2000). The PCE of large vehicles is often adjusted to account for hilly terrain, but it can 
also depend on the proportion of large vehicles in the traffic stream, and a large vehicle can have 
asymmetric effects on light and heavy vehicles (Peeta et al., 2004). 
A third complication is that traffic flows vary greatly by time of day, day of week, and 
season. Congestion tolls should therefore vary over time as well. Formulating a dynamic system 
optimum on a road network, deriving tolls that support the optimum, and solving the system of 
equations numerically remains a challenge despite many years of research.14 
A fourth complication is that congestion varies not only predictably with recurrent demand 
patterns but also unpredictably due to accidents, bad weather, special events, transit strikes, and 
                                                 
13 See Small and Verhoef (2007, Section 4.2) for further detail. 
14 See Carey and Srinivasan (1993), Ghali and Smith (1995), Boyce (2007), Friesz et al. (2008). 
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other shocks.15 Tolls should therefore vary according to real-time conditions and they should 
reflect the value that travelers place on travel time reliability as well as on travelers’ values of 
(average) travel time.16 
A fifth complication is that congestion affects the magnitudes of other road-traffic 
externalities including accidents (Hensher, 2006; Steimetz, 2008), emissions (Daniel and Bekka, 
2000; Glaister and Graham, 2005) and road damage (Hussain and Parker, 2006). This 
interdependence would not matter for setting congestion tolls if the external costs of accidents, 
emissions, and road damage were internalized by efficient pricing or some other means, but since 
these costs are not fully internalized these knock-on effects should, in principle, be factored in 
when setting congestion tolls . 
A sixth consideration is that externalities and other market failures exist not only in road 
transportation but also in other transport markets and other sectors of the economy. For example, 
urban public transit service has scale economies (a positive externality), but it is also heavily 
subsidized in most cities and fares can be overpriced or underpriced at existing subsidy levels. 
Labor markets are distorted by income taxes and this has implications for tolling commuting and 
work-related trips (Parry and Bento, 2001; van Dender, 2003). And traffic congestion affects 
agglomeration economies in urban areas (Graham, 2007). Levying congestion tolls could 
exacerbate, or ameliorate, these distortions and studies have shown that the effects may be of 
first-order importance. 
This brief review of the theory of congestion pricing reveals that congestion tolls should be 
differentiated by vehicle type, road link, time of day, real-time traffic conditions, trip purpose, 
and local conditions such as pricing of public transit service and other substitute modes of 
transport. In practice, tolls cannot be freely varied along all these dimensions. For technological, 
economic, or public acceptability reasons it may not be possible to toll all roads, to adjust tolls 
frequently by time of day, or to vary tolls according to traffic conditions. Lack of information or 
                                                 
15 Nonrecurring traffic congestion accounts for a large fraction of total delays in major urban areas. 
According to Schrank and Lomax (2009, Exhibit A-9) incident-related delays on US freeways ranged 
from 70% to 250% of recurring delay in the 43 largest urban areas. 
16 Small and Verhoef (2007, Section 2.6) review the theory and estimation of the value of travel time 
reliability. 
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legal prohibitions may also preclude toll discrimination according to certain vehicle or driver 
characteristics. 
In principle, the complications listed above (and many others) should be weighed when 
choosing a congestion pricing scheme and the levels and structure of tolls. In practice this is 
infeasible at anything like the theoretical ideal. Nevertheless, if the various complications are 
simply disregarded a congestion pricing scheme may perform badly, and quite possibly could be 
worse than doing nothing. Care should therefore be taken in deciding which complications are 
too important to ignore in a given application. 
Congestion pricing schemes can be categorized along several dimensions: (1) the type of 
scheme (e.g., facility-based, area-based, or distance-based, (2) the degree to which tolls vary 
over time, (3) other dimensions of toll differentiation, and (4) technology. Section 3 addresses 
the first three dimensions and Section 4 follows by discussing technology. This sequence is 
followed for two reasons. First, it facilitates presentation. Second, technology choice is 
subordinate to choices along the other three dimensions in the sense that technology is not an end 
itself and should be driven by policy needs. This does not imply, of course, that technology is 
unimportant. Technology choice affects system infrastructure and operating costs, flexibility, 
scalability, ability to differentiate tolls and other features of schemes as will be discussed in 
Section 4. Furthermore, no technology yet exists to implement the most sophisticated forms of 
congestion pricing that approach the theoretical ideal. Technology choices therefore cannot be 
made after decisions are made on how to implement congestion pricing. In practice. the choices 
are likely to be made iteratively and with repeated visits back to the “drawing board”. 
3 METHODS OF CONGESTION PRICING 
3.1 Types of congestion pricing schemes 
Congestion pricing schemes can be classified in various ways. The four categories considered 
here are presented roughly in order of increasing scale. 
Facility-based schemes 
For centuries tolls have been imposed on roads, bridges, and tunnels, and this is still the most 
common form of road pricing by far although congestion pricing per se has only been 
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implemented on a few facilities. Tolls can be levied either on all lanes of a facility or on 
designated toll lanes as is done on HOT lane facilities. Tolls can also be levied at a single point 
on a facility or at multiple points with the total amount paid determined by distance traveled (e.g. 
as on Highway 407 in Toronto and on the new I-15 Express Lanes which opened in 2009).17  
Cordons 
Toll cordons are a form of area-based charging in which vehicles pay a toll to cross a cordon in 
the inbound direction, in the outbound direction, or possibly in both directions. A cordon scheme 
can encompass multiple cordons, and it can include radial screenlines to control orbital 
movements. All existing schemes are single cordons. The Norwegian toll rings were the first 
cordons to be created, but their main purpose has been revenue generation rather than congestion 
pricing.18 The only cordon scheme designed to manage congestion is the Stockholm congestion 
charge.19 The cordon surrounds the city centre and has 18 control points. Tolls are paid on each 
inbound passage up to a daily maximum of 60 kronors ($8.47). Pricing is in effect on weekdays 
from 6:30 to 18:30. The toll is 10, 15, or 20 Swedish kronors ($1.41, $2.12, or $2.82) depending 
on time of day. There is no charge on weekends, holidays, or the day before holidays.20  
Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) scheme, launched in 1998, covers certain 
expressways and arterial roads as well as three restricted zones in the CBD and the Orchard 
cordon. It is therefore a hybrid of facility-based tolls and cordons. The charging period is 7:00-
10:00 and 12:00-20:00 for the CBD and Orchard cordon, and varies for expressways and 
                                                 
17 See http://www.407etr.com/About/tolls.htm and http://fastrak.511sd.com/index.aspx [August 29, 
2009]. 
18 Toll rings were established in Bergen (1986), Oslo (1990), and Trondheim (1991) as well as 
Kristiansand, Stavanger, Namsos, and Tønsberg. The Trondheim cordon was converted to a multi-sector 
zonal scheme in 1996, but tolling ended in 2005 when the policy package that included the toll ring 
expired. 
19 Since 2002, a £2.00 ($3.26) charge has been levied on vehicles entering the centre of Durham, England. 
The scheme operates like a cordon although only one, narrow public access road is involved. See Santos 
(2004) and http://www.durham.gov.uk/Pages/Service.aspx?ServiceId=6370 [August 29, 2009]. 
20 For details see Eliasson et al. (2009a). 
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arterials. Tolls are generally varied every half hour. As in Stockholm, payment is required for 
each passage or entry.21 
Zonal schemes 
With a zonal scheme (sometimes called an area charge) vehicles pay a fee to enter or exit a zone, 
or to travel within the zone without crossing its boundary. Zone boundaries can be defined by 
natural features such as rivers, lakes, oceans, and mountains, as well as by elements of the built 
environment such as roads, tunnels, bridges, residential neighborhoods, and jurisdictions (states 
or provinces can define zones). The only operational zonal congestion pricing scheme is the 
London congestion charge, introduced in 2003. The original charging zone comprised a 21 km2 
area around the city centre. A flat charge of ₤5 per day was levied on weekdays from 7:00-18:30 
for driving anywhere within the zone or for parking on public roads. In 2005, the toll was raised 
to ₤8, and in 2007 the charging period was shortened to end at 18:00 and the charging zone was 
expanded to include residential neighborhoods to the west. Travel along the boundary of the 
charging zone is free. Several vehicle categories are exempt, and residents of the charge area 
receive a 90% discount.22 
Distance-based schemes 
With distance-based schemes charges vary with distance travelled, either linearly or nonlinearly. 
As noted above, some facilities charge on the basis of distance. Networks of truck-only toll lanes 
and networks of HOT lanes are under consideration23 and tolls on these networks are likely to be 
distance-based as well. For schemes that encompass multiple roads or regions the charge rate can 
depend on type of road. Four US states have implemented distance or weight-based charges for 
heavy goods vehicles (Conway and Walton, 2009) but the charges are intended to recover the 
infrastructure costs imposed by heavy vehicles rather than to manage demand. National distance-
                                                 
21 http://www.lta.gov.sg/motoring_matters/motoring_erp.htm [August 29, 2009]. From 1975 to 1998, 
Singapore operated an Area License Scheme to control traffic in the CBD. Despite its name, the license 
was only required for vehicles traveling into the charging zone, not within it, and it was therefore 
effectively a cordon rather than a zonal scheme. 
22 http://www.tfl.gov.uk/roadusers/congestioncharging/ [August 29, 2009]. 
23 See Samuel et al. (2002) and Poole and Orski (2003). 
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based heavy goods vehicle tolls exist in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany, and several other 
European countries are developing or considering them. For the purpose of this review these 
schemes are mainly of interest regarding the technologies they use which will be discussed in 
Section 4. 
3.1.1 Degree of time differentiation 
Pricing schemes in general — and road tolls in particular — can be characterized as flat, 
scheduled, or responsive.24 Flat tolls are constant over time. Historically, tolls on most facilities 
were flat because of technological or administrative difficulties in changing the toll. In some 
schemes the toll prevails 24 hours a day. In others, such as the London Congestion Charge, the 
toll is levied at a constant rate during daytime on weekdays and not levied at other times. 
Scheduled tolls vary by time of day, day of week, and season according to a predetermined 
schedule. Examples include some HOT lane facilities in the US, Singapore’s Electronic Road 
Pricing, and Stockholm’s congestion charge. The time intervals between toll adjustments varies 
across schemes, and in some cases the interval in a given scheme varies by time of day. 
Responsive tolls vary in real time (or near real time) as a function of prevailing traffic 
conditions. The only examples of responsive pricing are a few HOT lane facilities where tolls are 
adjusted to maintain free-flow speeds. During the early 1990s a congestion pricing trial was 
conducted in Cambridge, UK, in which drivers paid a charge when travel speed dropped below a 
threshold value. The logic underlying this scheme was similar to responsive pricing on HOT 
lanes except that the Cambridge scheme applied to all roads within the central city zone.25 
                                                 
24 Terminology varies. Scheduled pricing is often referred to as “variable”, and responsive pricing as 
“dynamic”. Cottingham et al. (2007) use “static pricing” to describe any fixed schedule of charges that is 
announced well in advance (i.e., before travel decisions are made), and “dynamic charging” to describe 
charges that depend on contemporaneous congestion. Static pricing in their nomenclature covers both flat 
and scheduled pricing as defined here, and dynamic charging corresponds to responsive pricing here. 
25 The Cambridge scheme failed to advance beyond the trial because of opposition to the form of pricing 
and the perception that congestion was not bad enough to warrant tolls. Oldridge (1995) describes the 
planning, politics, and technology behind the experiment. 
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Responsive tolls are “reactive” in the sense that they are set (with a short time lag) as a 
function of current congestion levels. A step beyond reactive pricing in terms of sophistication is 
an anticipatory, or predictive, scheme in which tolls are based on forecast congestion. Dong et al. 
(2007) develop an algorithm to implement predictive pricing on a HOT lane facility and show 
that it can anticipate breakdowns in flow and maintain higher throughput than reactive pricing. 
Predictive pricing has long been envisaged as a tool for traffic management, but the information, 
communications, and computational requirements continue to pose a challenge.  
3.1.2 Other dimensions of differentiation 
As noted in Section 2, optimal congestion pricing calls for tolls to be differentiated in several 
dimensions in addition to time of day. Differentiation by vehicle type, number of axles, and 
weight is common practice although these vehicle characteristics are imperfectly correlated with 
the congestion externality that a vehicle imposes since the externality also depends on road 
characteristics and the mix of users on the road. Toll differentiation according to speed and other 
correlates of dangerous driving behaviour has been precluded by lack of information until 
recently although technological advances in on-board computers now make such differentiation 
feasible, and possibly practical. 
Toll discounts and exemptions for certain categories of vehicles and drivers are quite 
common. Various categories are exempt from the London and Stockholm congestion charges. 
London offers a 90% discount to residents, a 12.5% discount to fleets, and various discounts for 
monthly and annual payments. A number of toll roads and HOT lane facilities also offer quantity 
discounts in the form of reduced prices for advance purchase of multiple trips, or ex post 
discounts based on cumulative usage over an accounting period. Quantity discounts are 
commonly used in transportation markets26 as well as other sectors of the economy, but they are 
inconsistent with congestion pricing according to marginal social cost pricing principles. In some 
cases the discounts are used as a way to boost revenues, and in other cases they are offered for 
public acceptability reasons. 
                                                 
26 See Anderson and Renault (2009). 
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3.2 Choice of congestion pricing scheme 
Having described the main characteristics of congestion pricing schemes we now turn to the 
central problem of determining which type of scheme (if any) is best in a given setting. Most 
studies have focused on the design of a particular type of scheme rather than the choice between 
schemes although comparisons are becoming more common. Attention is focused here on the 
choice between facility-based schemes (with varying degrees of road network coverage) and 
area-based schemes. The most important consideration is whether a scheme can target 
congestion according to where and when it occurs without inducing excessive spatial or temporal 
traffic diversion. 
As explained in Section 2, link-based congestion tolls are theoretically optimal when all links 
can be tolled and the tolls can be freely differentiated by link, time of day, vehicle type, and 
other relevant dimensions. Under these conditions a facility-based congestion pricing scheme 
with individually-optimized tolls for every facility (link) of the road network would be optimal 
— at least before tallying toll collection costs. In practice, neither comprehensive tolling nor 
freely differentiated tolls is likely to be feasible for some time. The degree of network coverage, 
and the scope for toll differentiation, are therefore key determinants of how well facility-based 
schemes perform. 
High Occupancy Toll lanes are the smallest-scale existing congestion pricing schemes. Tolls 
are only paid on part of the capacity of a single road and high occupancy vehicles are exempt. 
Travelers can therefore avoid paying a toll by sharing a ride, by using the toll-free lanes, or by 
selecting another route if one is available. Simple models with two routes in parallel and 
identical users (e.g. Verhoef et al., 1996) indicate that the maximum potential benefits from 
congestion pricing are rather modest unless a large majority of road capacity can be tolled. The 
economics improve somewhat when heterogeneity of driver preferences is taken into account 
(Verhoef and Small, 2004) and improve further when value of travel time reliability is factored 
in (Small et al., 2006). The fraction of the first-best efficiency gains that can be derived from 
partial network tolling is also higher with scheduled tolls than with flat tolls (Braid, 1996; De 
Palma et al., 2004) because varying tolls over time to suppress congestion reduces the social cost 
of trips as well as the amount of traffic diversion onto untolled capacity. 
Assessing the performance of partial tolling schemes on real road networks is complicated by 
the multiplicity of origins and destinations; by differences in the capacities and lengths of links; 
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and by network topology which creates a complex interdependence between flows — with some 
links effectively operating as substitutes and others as complements. May et al. (2008) computed 
optimal (static) congestion tolls on the Edinburgh road network for different numbers of tolled 
links (n) on the assumption that the set of links that are tolled can be chosen freely for each n. 
They found that the benefits from tolling increased at a declining rate with n and concluded 
(p.149) that “less than 10 per cent of the links are required to achieve around 60-70 per cent of 
the first-best benefits.” This conclusion contrasts with the lessons from the two-routes-in-parallel 
network mentioned above in which there are sharply increasing returns from tolling both routes 
rather than one. The discrepancy in results highlights the difficulty of drawing general 
conclusions about the benefits from congestion pricing on networks. 
Besides failing to target congestion on part of the network, partial tolling has the drawback 
that it exacerbates congestion on untolled links and may cause safety and infrastructure damage 
too if untolled links are build to a lower design standard than the links that are tolled. The extent 
of traffic diversion depends on the availability of convenient, alternative toll-free links. Re-
routing options are limited in some US cities such as Boston, San Francisco, and Seattle, as well 
as cities such as Stockholm. Traffic diversion has been a problem on some toll roads.27 
Experience varies with the Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) charging schemes in Europe. Traffic 
diversion has been more of a problem in Austria where tolls are imposed only on primary roads, 
than in Switzerland where tolls are levied on all roads (Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). The German 
HGV toll is limited to federal motorways and some secondary roads, but traffic diversion has 
been minimal because many potential alternate routes are either closed to trucks or significantly 
slower (Broaddus and Gertz, 2008). 
Compared to facility-based pricing of individual roads or small-scale road networks, area-
based schemes have an advantage in intercepting more trips and are generally less susceptible to 
traffic diversion.28 As noted in the introduction, the London and Stockholm schemes appear to be 
                                                 
27 Swan and Belzer (2008) describe a case of traffic diversion off the Ohio Turnpike. 
28 For example, Olszewski and Xie (2005) find that toll elasticities in Singapore are higher for 
expressways than for the city centre cordon. 
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economically beneficial although this has been disputed.29 Before the Stockholm cordon charge 
began there was concern that traffic within the zone would increase because no charge is levied 
while traveling within it. Schemes with sub-zones (as in Trondheim) and differential charge rates 
were considered before settling on a single cordon with a single charge (Eliasson et al., 2009b). 
One reason for the good performance of the Stockholm charge is that the city is built on 
islands and just 18 access points suffice to form a cordon. In urban areas without natural 
boundaries choosing the number of cordons and where to locate them can be difficult. May et al. 
(2008) assess a variety of cordon options for London that differ in the number of cordons, the 
direction of movement in which charges apply, and the inclusion of radial screen lines. They find 
that the best-performing option (with three cordons, four screen lines and bi-directional charges) 
yields several times the benefits from a single cordon. The best single cordon performs poorly 
because it imposes the same charge on all journeys and allows many journeys to escape payment 
by rerouting. This illustrates how differences between cities in topology (and perhaps other 
factors such as population, area, public transit service quality and so on) influence the 
effectiveness of particular types of schemes. 
Zonal schemes share most of the advantages and disadvantages of cordons. Zones are 
superior insofar as drivers are charged for moving within the zone, although the charge is 
independent of distance and for very short trips a zero charge would be superior.30 “The choice 
between cordons and zonal schemes has not been extensively studied31 and practical experience 
                                                 
29 Prud’homme and Bocarejo (2005) conclude that the London charge is not cost effective, and 
Prud’homme and Kopp (2006) make a similar claim about the Stockholm charge. Mackie (2005) critiques 
Prud’homme and Bocarejo’s (2005) analysis. 
 
30 Mayor Bloomberg’s initial plan for congestion pricing in New York City featured car tolls of $8 for 
entering or leaving the charging zone, and a lower $4 toll for driving inside it. 
31 De Palma et al. (2005a) use a dynamic simulator to compare cordon and zonal charges for an area 
bounded by a ring road on a stylized urban road network. The zonal charge is paid for more trips and has 
a greater effect on mode choice and departure time decisions. Since average trips within the area are 
shorter than trips to or from outside, the optimal zonal charge is lower than the cordon toll but it leaves a 
larger fraction of travelers worse off. Maruyama and Sumalee (2007) use a static network equilibrium 
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is limited since the London and Stockholm schemes are the only large-scale examples of each 
type that were designed for congestion pricing. 
 A frequently asked question is whether area-based schemes of the sort implemented in 
Europe would work in the US. Several authors in Richardson and Bae (2008) address this 
question and their overall assessment is negative. Compared to Europe congestion in the US is 
less concentrated in city centres and more prevalent on expressways. With the exception of New 
York City no US metropolitan area experiences congestion as severe as London’s. Urban sprawl 
and trip chaining undermine public transit as a viable alternative to driving in the US. Public 
demands that toll-free routes must exist are also stronger in the US than in Europe, and this too 
militates against charging whole areas rather than selected facilities. 
3.3 Choice of time variation 
For each type of charging scheme reviewed in the previous section there is a choice between flat, 
scheduled, and responsive tolls. 
Flat tolls 
It is often claimed, or implicitly assumed, that flat tolls are suitable for maximizing revenue 
whereas scheduled or responsive tolls are preferable to control congestion. Reality is not quite as 
black and white. A revenue-maximizing toll road operator has an incentive to internalize the 
congestion costs that users impose on each other and will therefore generally prefer a toll that 
varies over time. Furthermore, the price elasticity of demand generally varies over time (demand 
is often less elastic during peak than off-peak periods) and so, therefore, does the profit-
maximizing markup that the operator will want to charge on top of the Pigouvian toll. In the case 
of London travel speeds in the city centre were relatively constant during daytime hours prior to 
introduction of the charge, and little might have been gained in terms of social welfare by 
varying tolls during the charge period (Leape, 2006). All that said, given the ease of varying tolls 
using Electronic Toll Collection technology, either scheduled or responsive tolling is generally 
preferable for congestion pricing under most circumstances. 
                                                                                                                                                             
simulation to compare cordon and zonal charges for chained trips in Utsunomiya city near Tokyo. They 
find that the zonal charge is slightly more inequitable than the cordon toll but the difference in impacts are 
slight. 
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Scheduled tolls 
Toll schedules are defined by the level set for the toll in each time step and the time interval 
between steps. Most analytical studies assume that schedules are chosen to be second-best 
optimal; i.e., to maximize welfare subject to applicable constraints. Practice has been rather more 
pragmatic. In Singapore, toll schedules are adjusted quarterly, and during June and December 
school holidays, to maintain target speeds of 45-65 km/h on expressways and 20-30 km/h on 
arterials at least 85% of the time (Chew, 2008). On SR-91, tolls are adjusted using information 
on traffic volumes to maintain free-flowing conditions on the Express Lanes without reducing 
their throughput.32 Conditions on the general purpose lanes and on other links in the road 
network are not considered. 
The toll setting rules in Singapore and on SR-91 resemble third-best pricing because they 
apply first-best pricing rules while ignoring congestion levels on untolled links of the network. 
Third-best pricing is generally inferior to second-best pricing and it can be worse than not tolling 
at all (Verhoef et al., 1996). However, De Palma et al. (2005b) show that with pure queuing 
congestion a “no-queue” tolling policy to eliminate queues performs fairly well relative to 
second-best tolling. Moreover, setting tolls to maintain a target level of service on tolled 
infrastructure has some advantages.33 First, it is less computationally demanding than second-
best tolling because only information about the tolled links is required. Second, tolls can be 
found by trial and error and (as in Singapore and on SR-91) periodically adjusted as demand 
evolves or as capacity changes elsewhere on the road network. Third, the decision rule is readily 
explained to users and the general public, and fourth it is easy to verify using traffic flow data 
that the rule is being followed. 
The time interval between toll steps varies across schemes. On SR-91 it is one hour, in 
Stockholm it is 30, 60 or 90 minutes during peak periods and longer during the middle of the 
day, and in Singapore tolls generally vary every half hour. Schedules with small time steps may 
be difficult to remember, but they have the advantage that tolls change by small amounts 
between steps and motorists have less incentive to speed up or slow down in order to catch the 
                                                 
32 http://www.91expresslanes.com/generalinfo/policyupdates.asp 
33 For further discussion see De Palma et al. (2005). 
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“lower” toll. In 2003, Singapore introduced five-minute graduated rates between some half hour 
periods for this reason (Chew, 2008). 
Responsive tolls 
Responsive tolls have only been implemented to date on a few HOT lanes. On I-15 in San Diego 
and I-394 in Minneapolis the goal is to maximize utilization of the toll lanes while maintaining 
free-flow speeds. Tolls are adjusted as frequently as every six minutes on I-15 and every three 
minutes on I-394. Responsive pricing has the advantage that tolls can be adjusted according to 
actual travel conditions. Thus, if an accident blocks a lane on a multi-lane highway, the toll can 
be raised in order to limit the number of drivers who enter the lane during the disruption. 
Responsive tolling has worked well on HOT lanes, and it may be practical on individual 
facilities where all capacity is tolled. But there are several caveats. First, responsive tolling 
would probably not be suitable for area-based schemes unless public transit and other 
alternatives to driving have adequate capacity to accommodate travelers who do not want to pay 
a high toll. Second, responsive tolling can be effective only if travelers are aware of tolls 
sufficiently far in advance for them to modify their travel decisions. Third, individuals may be 
risk-averse to uncertain charges (Bonsall and Knockaert, 2008). Indeed, some businesses were 
against responsive tolling on I-15 because it would create uncertainty about their monthly bills 
(Bonsall et al., 2007). 
3.4 Scheme complexity 
The efficiency of markets depends on how much consumers know about prices and how 
much effort they have to expend to obtain the information. This general economics principle 
applies to the use of roads and tolls. From a user’s perspective the complexity of a congestion 
pricing scheme depends on how much tolls vary by type of road, location, and time of day; 
whether tolls are responsive; how total amount paid varies with distance driven, and so on. Are 
there discounts for purchasing multiple cordon passes? Are there ceilings on the amount paid per 
day? Does the charge paid depend on the method of payment?  
The dangers of designing an overly complex price system are highlighted in the recent report 
of the US National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission (2009, p.141): 
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“Even a road pricing system … where the payment system does not change, entails new 
information about the costs of traveling at certain times and on certain roads. This requires 
people to know more and to make more informed and more frequent decisions about travel.” 
 
If travelers are misinformed about tolls they are liable to make mistakes that leave them worse 
off and that also undermine overall system efficiency because their responses deviate from what 
is intended. As travelers become accustomed to a charging system they may err less frequently, 
but they may also fall into habits and fail to modify their decisions if circumstances change. And 
if the system is very complex it may be strongly opposed. As Bonsall et al. (2007, 680) remark: 
“A prime requirement is that the logic of the charge structure, and the necessity of a degree of 
complexity, is capable of being communicated and is seen to reflect the objectives of the 
scheme.” 
4 CONGESTION PRICING TECHNOLOGIES 
4.1 Functions to perform and types of systems 
All congestion pricing technologies must perform three basic functions: (1) measurement of road 
usage by identifying vehicles and recording their locations and/or the distance they have 
traveled, (2) communication of data for billing purposes, and (3) enforcement. With conventional 
systems that use toll booths vehicle detection and payment are done manually and access is 
controlled by physical barriers. Toll booths have largely given way to Electronic Toll Collection 
(ETC) technology which allows drivers to pay without using cash or stopping. There are three 
types of ETC systems (Noordegraaf et al., 2009): 
 
1. Roadside-only systems that use Automatic Number Plate Recognition. 
2. Tag & beacon systems that use short-range microwave technology: either Dedicated Short 
Range Communications, or infrared-based. 
3. In vehicle-only systems that rely either on satellites or cellular networks. 
 
Roadside-only systems and tag & beacon systems require roadside infrastructure and only record 
point data. To determine distance traveled a vehicle must be detected at a sequence of locations. 
(Distances can also be measured directly using odometers and (in the case of trucks) electronic 
tachographs.) In vehicle-only systems track a vehicle’s course and do not require roadside 
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infrastructure although infrastructure-based technology may be used in tandem for enforcement 
purposes. 
4.2 Component technologies 
Each of the three types of ETC system comprises one or more component technologies that each 
perform one or more of the three basic functions (Table 1). 
4.2.1 Automatic Number Plate Recognition 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology uses digital cameras and optical 
character recognition (OCR) software to record an image of a vehicle and its license plate. 
ANPR is used standalone with roadside-only systems although this requires collecting and 
processing images for every vehicle. ANPR is more commonly used for enforcement because 
only violators have to be processed and — unlike other technologies — ANPR does not require 
that vehicles have equipment in working condition. 
4.2.2 Dedicated Short Range Communications 
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) is a means of Automated Vehicle 
Identification (AVI). Antennas mounted on overhead gantries communicate with tags or 
transponders on vehicles as they pass by. Like ANPR, DSRC technology can be used for all 
three basic functions: road usage measurement, data communication, and enforcement. DSRC is 
used on many existing facility-based road pricing schemes. It can also be used in conjunction 
with on-board units (see vehicle equipment below) to operate a zonal tolling system by activating 
a vehicle’s on-board unit when it crosses into the zone, and deactivating it when the vehicle 
leaves the zone. 
4.2.3 Satellite systems 
Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, developed by the US military, is a member of a 
class of systems called Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) which include the European 
Galileo system that is under development. GPS is used for navigation and other military and 
civilian functions. GPS can be used in conjunction with General Packet Radio Service (GPRS): a 
cellular data service for communications, and with Geographical Information Systems (GIS) that 
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translate latitude and longitude data into locations on a digitized road map. A drawback of GPS 
is that satellite signals can be lost in tunnels, and intercepted by overpasses and high buildings 
(the urban canyon effect). For backup, odometers can be used to record distance and dead-
reckoning can be used to keep track of location (although accuracy declines with distance 
traveled). 
4.2.4 Cellular networks 
Cellular networks are used by cellular phones. The most popular standard is Global System for 
Mobile (GSM) communications which uses Short Message Service (SMS). Cellular networks 
show promise as a means of for road pricing although the application is not as well developed as 
it is for GPS. Like GPS, cellular networks do not require roadside infrastructure and 
communications is possible anywhere rather than being restricted to gantries or locations where 
transponders have been installed. 
4.2.5 Vehicle equipment 
All vehicles are equipped with a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) that conveys such 
information as vehicle class, year of manufacture, make, model and weight. On-board units are 
more elaborate devices with computational capabilities, memory storage, and an interface for 
communication with DSRC, GPS, or cellular networks. Transponders are used for 
communication using DSRC. 
4.3 Technologies used in existing road pricing schemes 
This section provides an overview of a sample of road pricing schemes to illustrate the range of 
technologies and technology combinations that are either being used for congestion pricing or 
can be adapted to implement it. The list in Table 2 covers four categories: HOT lanes, area-based 
schemes, European distance-based heavy goods vehicle schemes, and US studies of distance-
based charges for passenger vehicles. 
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High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes 
SR-91 in Orange County, California was the first HOT lane facility in the world. Tolls are 
scheduled.34 I-15 in San Diego was the second facility and the first to adopt responsive tolls; it is 
currently being expanded to a managed lanes facility with multiple entry and exit points and tolls 
that are based on distance traveled. I-394 was the second facility to adopt responsive pricing and 
the first to separate toll lanes from general-purpose lanes using only striping rather than 
barriers.35 All three facilities use transponders for road use measurement and communications, 
and all three rely on visual inspection to enforce occupancy requirements (as do all other High 
Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) and HOT facilities). The three facilities differ in the vehicle 
occupancy requirement for toll exemptions or discounts and in the range of technologies used to 
verify payment and to intercept violators. 
Area-based schemes 
The Singapore, London, and Stockholm schemes are the only area-based schemes designed to 
control congestion. Singapore’s ERP scheme uses DSRC technology for road use measurement 
whereas London and Stockholm use ANPR.36 Ken Livingstone was determined to implement a 
congestion charge during his first term as mayor of London and he opted for ANPR as a proven 
and low risk technology despite its high infrastructure and operating costs. During the Stockholm 
trial in 2006 both ANPR and transponders were used and approximately half the transactions 
were processed by each mode. ANPR worked so well that transponders were abandoned when 
the scheme became permanent in 2007. Transponders are still used for vehicles that are exempt 
from payment. 
                                                 
34 Dynamic pricing of SR-91 is being studied as a Value Pricing project (FHWA, 2008). 
35 Several other HOT lane facilities are operating and a number of new ones are either being built or 
planned. Some will feature scheduled tolls, and others responsive tolls; see FHWA (2008). 
36 Both ANPR and transponders were used during the Stockholm trial in 2006, and approximately half the 
transactions were processed by each mode. ANPR worked so well that transponders were abandoned 
when the scheme became permanent in 2007. Transponders are still used for vehicles that are exempt 
from payment. 
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4.3.1 European distance-based Heavy Goods Vehicle schemes 
In Switzerland, Austria, and Germany, heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) pay tolls proportional to 
distance traveled on some, or all, roads. None of the three scheme was designed for congestion 
pricing although the Austrian and German technologies permit some differentiation of tolls by 
time and location. 
The Swiss toll applies to HGVs over 3.5 metric tons gross vehicle weight and is paid on the 
whole 71,000 km national road network. It is differentiated by emissions class37 but not by type 
of road or time of day. Distance is recorded using a digital tachograph and a smart card. The unit 
is activated by roadside DSRC transponders when a vehicle enters the country and deactivated 
when it exits. Charges are paid by inserting the smart card into a roadside terminal (Cottingham 
et al., 2007). 
In contrast to the Swiss system, HGV tolls in Austria are only charged on the 2,060 km 
primary road network and are not differentiated by emissions class. An on-board unit called a 
“Go Box” is used for communications. The Swiss on-board unit can be used in Austria.38 
The German HGV scheme applies to federal motorways and some secondary roads (12,000 
km in total). Toll differentiation is similar to Switzerland but the technology is more advanced in 
using GPS to measure distance and GSM for communications. DSRC beacons are used for 
backup location information (Cottingham et al., 2007). The system is scalable in that more roads 
can be added, and the technology allows tolls to be differentiated by road type and time of day. 
Belgium, the Czech republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Slovenia, Slowakia and Sweden 
are all considering HGV charging schemes that vary according to class of road covered, scope of 
toll differentiation, and technology (GINA, 2009; Noordegraaf et al., 2009; Dutch Ministry, 
2009). The UK Department for Transport (2004) proposed a national scheme of road pricing for 
Great Britain with HGVs to be charged first. Tolls were to be differentiated by type of road, 
vehicle weight, number of axles, and emissions class, followed later by possible further 
differentiation by time of day and geographic area (Sorenson and Taylor, 2005). However, 
                                                 
37 The toll rate is set to reflect the costs of health care, accidents, damage to buildings, and noise 
(Broaddus and Gertz, 2008). 
38 Most existing tolling schemes are not interoperable either between countries or within them. 
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projected costs for the technology escalated, and the plan was eventually abandoned — 
ostensibly on the grounds that it should be integrated with charging of passenger vehicles. 
4.3.2 Plans for distance-based charges for passenger vehicles 
Several countries have studied distance-based charges for passenger vehicles. As just noted, a 
scheme was planned for Great Britain but it has been shelved in the face of strong public 
opposition. In 2008, the Dutch Parliament approved a national distance-based system of user 
charges (the Dutch Mobility Plan) that uses satellite technology and is to be introduced from 
2012 to 2017. The fee per kilometer will be differentiated by emissions class and time of day. 
The US is in the preliminary stages of considering a Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) fee as a 
long-run alternative to fuel taxes as the primary funding mechanism for roads. Depending on the 
technology used the fee could be varied by time, distance, and location to price congestion. 
Several US experiments with regional distance-based pricing have been conducted or are under 
way that provide evidence on the technological possibilities and challenges (see Table 2). The 
Oregon Vehicle Miles Traveled Pricing Pilot Project (2004-2006) was designed to test the 
viability of distance-based charges as a replacement for fuel taxes.39 Charges were defined by 
zone and set higher during AM and PM peak periods. Test vehicles were equipped with GPS 
devices that recorded mileage but only aggregate distance was recorded and vehicle movements 
could not be tracked.. The distance-based charge was paid automatically when the vehicle 
refueled at participating gasoline stations and the state fuel tax was deducted from the bill. The 
study found that GPS technology was reliable and assured privacy protection. 
The Puget Sound Regional Council conducted a six-year study (2002-2008) of driver 
responses to network-wide facility-based tolls.40 Tolls were differentiated by road type (higher 
on freeways than on arterials) and time of day (substantially higher during AM and PM peaks).41 
Unlike in the Oregon project GIS was required in combination with GPS to record separately 
                                                 
39 See Whitty (2007, 2009). 
40 See Puget Sound Regional Council (2002), Whitty (2009) and www.psrc.org/projects/trafficchoices. 
41 The tolls were virtual in the sense that test volunteers did not actually incur out-of-pocket costs. 
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distances traveled on freeways and arterials. Test results were used to assess the merits of several 
road pricing schemes ranging from HOT lanes to all freeways and major arterials. 
A third study, launched in 2005 and administered by the University of Iowa, is conducting a 
feasibility assessment of GPS-based tolling technology as well as gauging drivers’ responses and 
public attitudes towards it.42 Several test sites are located across the country. As in the Puget 
Sound study GIS is used in combination with GPS to record distances within the region, to 
compute charges on the vehicle, and to download updates to the database. Only aggregate 
charging data is transmitted from the vehicle. Unlike in the Oregon and Puget Sound studies, 
tolls are flat. 
4.4 Choice of technology 
Any congestion pricing technology (or road pricing technology in general ) has to perform the 
three basic functions of road use measurement, communication of billing data, and enforcement. 
The best technology choice depends, inter alia, on the type of charging scheme and the degree of 
toll differentiation to be implemented. Assessments are made here for the four technology 
systems evaluated by Noordegraaf et al. (2009), referred to here as ANPR, DSRC, Satellite, and 
Cellular. Table 3 reproduces Table 2 in Noordegraaf et al. (2009) with the exception of omitting 
the privacy criterion which is discussed subsequently as well as several additional assessment 
criteria. Noordegraaf et al. rank the systems for applications to distance-based charging All the 
criteria are relevant for tolling facilities, cordons, and zones as well although the rankings vary. 
4.4.1 Location accuracy 
Location accuracy refers to accuracy in detecting and identifying vehicles and recording where 
they are. ANPR and DSRC use infrastructure in the vicinity of roadways and can identify location 
precisely if they receive a proper signal. Modern DSRC technology has a recognition accuracy of 
99% or better. ANPR has several limitations. It can fail in bad weather or when the camera view 
of a number plate is obscured by dirt or other vehicles. Readability of license plates varies by 
country. And on multilane highways cameras must be mounted overhead on gantries rather than 
beside the roadway to provide adequate lines of sight. 
                                                 
42 See www.roaduserstudy.org and Kuhl (2009). 
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Satellite systems provide nearly ubiquitous coverage. But their resolution is inferior to 
infrastructure-based technology and they can fail to distinguish between closely-spaced roads.43 
As noted earlier, GPS signals can be disrupted by the urban canyon effect which is a greater 
problem in cities where accuracy is most important.44 Another limitation is that commercial GIS 
maps do not always provide a consistent level of accuracy (Donath et al., 2009). Unlike GPS, 
cellular systems are not susceptible to the urban canyon effect. But their spatial resolution is 
limited by cellular tower density, which makes them more suitable for zonal than facility-based 
schemes (although density tends to be higher in cities). 
4.4.2 Roadside infrastructure costs 
ANPR and DSRC require roadside infrastructure whereas Satellite and Cellular do not unless 
ANPR and DSRC is used for enforcement. Roadside infrastructure is expensive to install, 
occupies space, is costly or impossible to relocate, requires maintenance, and is susceptible to 
vandalism. Given the high costs, ANPR and DSRC are likely to be economic only for tolling 
heavily used facilities. Collection costs for legacy facility-based systems in the US amount to 
roughly 16% of toll revenues (NSTIFC, 2009). For cordon and zonal schemes the corresponding 
percentages are somewhat higher: 21% in Singapore, 22% for the Stockholm Trial, and 50-60% 
for London.45 In contrast, operating costs are lower for the HGV schemes in Europe: 4% for 
Switzerland, 9% for Austria, and 16% for Germany (Broaddus and Gertz, 2008)46. These lower 
percentages are attributable in part to the relatively high per kilometer fees that trucks pay and 
the long distances they travel. 
The costs of national schemes that cover all vehicles are difficult to estimate — especially 
since the costs are sensitive to details of the technology choice (Glaister and Graham, 2008). The 
                                                 
43 The European Union is developing another GNSS system, Galileo, which will be more accurate than 
GPS. However, Galileo is several years behind schedule 
(http://www.insidegnss.com/node/1426#Baseband_Technologies_Inc [July 24, 2009]). 
44 Samuel (2009). 
45 These figures are reported, along with sources, in Lindsey (2007, Table A1). 
46 Capital costs are 4% of revenues for Switzerland, 3% for Austria, and 7% for Germany (Broaddus and 
Gertz, 2008). 
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Dutch government has set a goal to limit administrative costs to 5% of revenues. Since much of 
the costs of Satellite and Cellular systems are fixed, average total costs are likely to be lower for 
large countries. A further consideration in choosing a congestion pricing technology is that a 
system may be capable of providing additional services such as pricing of parking and insurance, 
navigation assistance, revenue generation, and so on. If so, the full system costs are not wholly 
attributable to the congestion pricing function. The attributable portion depends, inter alia, on 
which service is considered incremental which may not be clear. 
4.4.3 In-vehicle equipment costs 
Except for readable license plates ANPR does not need vehicle equipment whereas the other 
three technologies require on-board units. DSRC systems require a transponder. Satellite systems 
require an antenna, a power source, and (for systems that use GIS) digital maps with sufficient 
accuracy to locate a vehicle on a particular road (Donath et al., 2009). Mobile phones can be 
used as OBUs with Cellular systems, and this reduces the costs since most drivers already have a 
mobile phone although phones must somehow be linked to a given vehicle (Cottingham et al., 
2007). 
4.4.4 Flexibility 
System flexibility has several dimensions: flexibility to redeploy or expand the charging area, 
flexibility to modify or extend toll differentiation by road, time of day and vehicle 
characteristics, and flexibility to add services such as route guidance. Infrastructure-based 
systems tend to be less flexible than in-vehicle systems in all three respects. Since ANPR does 
not use in-vehicle equipment ANPR systems cannot be changed or improved using vehicle 
technology. And DSRC systems are less flexible than Satellite and Cellular systems because they 
tend to use OBUs with fewer capabilities (Noordegraaf et al., 2009).47 
                                                 
47 In the University of Iowa experiment toll tables can be updated by downloading new tables over 
cellular networks (Kuhl, 2009). 
  27
4.4.5 Scalability 
The scalability of a technology is inversely related to the amount of roadside infrastructure it 
requires. ANPR and DSRC are therefore at a marked disadvantage relative to Satellite and 
Cellular for regional, intercity, or national applications. Indeed, the London congestion charge 
could not economically be expanded to include Greater London even if the charging area 
remained as a single zone (Cottingham et al., 2007). Cellular systems based on text messaging 
have an advantage over other cellular technologies since they require less bandwidth and can be 
implemented using most cellular networks (Donath et al., 2009). 
4.4.6 Privacy protection 
Privacy protection has been a challenge for electronic road pricing at least since Hong Kong’s 
electronic road pricing experiments in the 1980s. Noordegraaf et al. (2009) argue that legislation 
is sufficient to ensure privacy protection. This is debatable given the various, ingenious ways that 
scofflaws find to bypass technological safeguards, and the danger that governments may 
circumvent or override laws — whether in the pursuit of criminal activity or for other reasons. 
Privacy concerns could be assuaged by not keeping records of vehicle movements but this would 
undermine system accountability. The use of ANPR in London and Stockholm for road use 
measurement has not evoked adverse reactions and ANPR is used for enforcement in many other 
systems. Satellite and Cellular systems are more vulnerable to interception than ANPR or DSRC 
because information is transmitted over much longer distances. This problem can be alleviated 
by performing calculations with on-board units and limiting communications to aggregate 
amounts owed. A further concern is that systems with on-board units that record travel speed 
could provide information that is used in court in case of an accident or by insurance companies 
to adjust insurance rates (Sorensen and Taylor, 2005). 
4.4.7 Enforcement 
Enforcement is required to intercept vehicles without functioning in-vehicle equipment, or 
equipment that has been corrupted to provide false identification or other information. Of the 
four technologies, only ANPR does not rely on in-vehicle equipment and — except for problems 
with false or stolen number plates (as has occurred in London) — ANPR is robust to tampering. 
ANPR is the most common means of enforcement for facility-based and area-based congestion 
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pricing schemes (cf. Table 2). Its big drawback for regional, intercity, or national applications is 
the high cost of establishing cameras throughout the network although, as Cottingham et al. 
(2007) point out, it may be possible to achieve sufficiently high rates of detection for deterrence 
purposes if cameras are limited to intersections and high-volume links. 
An alternative to cameras or other fixed infrastructure enforcement technologies are mobile 
monitors or readers such as those used by the German HGV system and on I-394. Mobile 
enforcement is more cost-effective relative to stationary enforcement methods when only certain 
categories of vehicles (e.g. trucks) are tolled. 
An additional enforcement task in the case of HOT lanes is to verify that vehicles choosing 
not to pay a toll meet the minimum vehicle occupancy requirement. Visual inspection has proved 
to be unreliable and it is also costly in labour input as well as land at facilities where an extra 
lane is built as an “enforcement zone” to facilitate observation. Research is underway on 
automated vehicle occupancy verification technologies that operate either on the roadside or 
inside vehicles. According to Poole (2009) most of the roadside systems cannot yet detect people 
in rear seats (which is required to enforce HOV3+ requirements) and in-vehicle system face legal 
challenges due to privacy concerns.48 
4.4.8 Scope for toll differentiation 
Toll differentiation by vehicle characteristics such as number of axles, GVW, and emissions 
class can be done using any of the technologies simply by registering the vehicle on a database 
(Noordegraaf et al. (2009). Differentiation by time of day is also straightforward. Differentiation 
by road type is done automatically with facility-based schemes. For distance-based schemes 
DSRC is used with the Austrian HGV charge, while GPS is used in Germany and in the Puget 
Sound study. 
Discounts and exemptions are provided to several categories of users in the London and 
Stockholm schemes by either registering them in a database or using DSRC (in Stockholm). 
Exemptions may also be desired for certain users on private roads and for residents on local 
public roads who have paid for roads with property taxes. Such exemptions can be implemented 
                                                 
48 As an alternative to a technology solution Poole suggests that policy be changed to require all vehicles 
using HOT lanes to carry a transponder and to require vehicles used for toll-free carpooling to pre-register 
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by locating transponders or beacons at appropriate points on the network. Since satellite 
technology allows vehicles to be tracked it may be possible to price discriminate according to 
where vehicles are coming from and where they are going. For example, tolls could be set as an 
increasing function of the fraction of users coming from outside the jurisdiction responsible for 
tolling (Roth, 2009). Tolls could also be differentiated vehicle-by-vehicle although this may be 
illegal. 
4.4.9 Additional services 
The four technologies differ widely in their scope for providing services besides toll collection. 
For ANPR there is no scope other than using vehicle and license plate images for law 
enforcement. DSRC is also limited by the capabilities of on-board units and by the fact that 
communications is possible only when vehicles are near receivers. Satellite and Cellular systems 
offer greater potential for providing navigational aid and travel advisories, as well as charging 
for parking, insurance and other services. Grush and Roth (2008) describe a system — similar to 
that used for telecommunications — that would perform these functions with charges 
differentiated by time, distance, and place. 
4.5 Traveler information49 
Information about travel conditions helps individuals make optimal mode, departure time, route 
and other travel choice decisions.50 For decades, travel information has been available from 
traditional sources such as newspaper, television, commercial radio and Highway Advisory 
Radio, as well as field devices such as changeable message signs. Television can provide 
relatively up-to-date information, but neither television nor newspapers provides en-route 
information. Message signs have the advantage of providing relevant location information 
                                                 
49 This section draws heavily on NCHRP (2009). 
50 System operators also require information to set optimal congestion tolls — whether this be information 
on average annual daily traffic flows to set flat tolls, or real-time information on weather and incidents to 
set responsive tolls. Information can be obtained from many sources including conventional traffic 
counters, loop detectors, wireless radar, helicopter patrols, updates from road construction and 
maintenance departments, and reports from motorists. 
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without requiring drivers to do more than look at the signs. But signs are limited in how much 
information they can convey, and they cannot provide pre-trip travel information. Signs are also 
costly to install and maintain. 
Starting in the 1990s new information sources have become available: traffic websites, 
cellular phones, smart phones, Personal Intelligent Travel Assistants, and (in the US) publicly-
operated 511 phone systems. In addition to navigational assistance and other services these 
technologies can provide travelers with information about tolls. In the case of flat or scheduled 
tolls, rates can be posted on the internet and viewed or downloaded at home. Conveying 
responsive tolls is more challenging because tolls can change rapidly and pre-trip information 
may be obsolete by the time the toll is paid. Portable devices or in-vehicle screens that display 
real-time tolls may be useful (Cottingham et al., 2007; Noordegraaf et al., 2009). Nevertheless, 
making complex trip decisions en-route, or even pre-trip, may be so cognitively demanding that 
travelers will prefer to delegate decisions to on-board units on their vehicles, or to central 
computers of the information service provider or toll operator. Travelers could program an on-
board unit to select a route with the shortest distance, shortest expected travel time, or lowest 
expected generalized cost. Websites already exist that do this. For example, Traffic.com allows 
users to specify a starting point and ending point.51 Using real-time information derived from 
proprietary and external sources it determines two routes: a direct route and a route with the 
shortest current travel time. Information is provided for each route on distance, drive time, speed 
limit, delay, and average speed. A “jam factor” (on a scale of 0-10) is also reported for major 
roads along the routes as well as the number of incidents in progress and an indication whether 
congestion is “building”, “holding”, or “clearing”. Motorists can receive traffic alerts by SMS, 
automated voice call, and e-mail. The service is provided free in 52 US cities. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Congestion pricing is an idea with a long academic pedigree that is slowly gaining credence 
amongst practitioners and policymakers. The rate at which congestion pricing is implemented, 
and its ultimate scope, will depend on what technology is used and on what other functions and 
services can be performed with the technology. Since congestion pricing calls for the greatest 
                                                 
51 http://www.traffic.com [September 4, 2009]. 
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overall degree of toll differentiation according to vehicle characteristics, location, time of day 
and real-time conditions, congestion pricing is likely to drive the technology choice. The 
economics of congestion pricing are much more attractive if the cost of congestion pricing is 
considered incremental to the cost of a system that can perform other functions than if the whole 
cost is attributed to congestion pricing alone. 
The scope of a congestion pricing scheme is defined by how much of the road network is 
covered, what vehicles pay tolls, and the degree to which tolls are differentiated. Most studies 
argue that congestion pricing should be implemented in steps rather than as a “big bang” 
(Verhoef et al., 2007). Staged implementation may be necessary to overcome public opposition 
to congestion pricing by demonstrating its benefits without committing huge amounts of 
resources or exposing large numbers of unwilling participants to potentially significant losses. 
Limited-scale experiments are also useful for testing new technologies and determining which 
technology works best for a given type of congestion pricing scheme in a given area. 
Congestion pricing is a limited patchwork of schemes at present. Facility-based schemes 
dominate in North America. Europe has a few area-based urban congestion pricing schemes and 
a few intercity distance-based schemes for heavy goods vehicles that are designed primarily for 
revenue generation and internalization of external costs other than congestion. Since congestion 
is concentrated in cities this emphasis of the European HGV schemes is understandable. 
However, the technologies used for distance-based pricing can be adapted to congestion pricing. 
Furthermore, governments are facing growing pressure to generate more revenues from user-
based charges, and to transition away from fuel taxes. Distance-based charges can be used for 
this purpose and they can be applied to passenger vehicles as well as freight vehicles. 
There are several reasons to implement distance-based tolls for heavy goods vehicles first. 
Many HGVs are already equipped with GPS-based fleet management systems and additional 
equipment for levying tolls can be added at moderate cost. Toll collection costs per unit of 
revenue are likely to be much lower than for passenger vehicles because trucks are driven long 
distances and pay higher tolls per kilometer. And truck drivers and shippers are already familiar 
with the technology and seem less concerned about privacy than automobile drivers. Some new 
automobiles are equipped with on-board units that make distance-based pricing practical at 
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reasonable cost.52 However, older vehicles lack this equipment and retrofitting is difficult and 
costly (Whitty, 2009). A prolonged phase-in period for passenger vehicles is therefore likely 
before satellite (or possibly cellular) technology could become universal. 
Universal coverage of the road network is also unlikely to be achieved for some time — in 
part because toll enforcement is not yet possible without some form of roadside infrastructure 
that is expensive to build and operate on a wide geographical scale. Traffic diversion from tolled 
to untolled roads is therefore a potential problem, and the challenges of second-best pricing 
discussed in Sections 2 and 3 will remain relevant. 
The history of successes and failures with road pricing suggests that simple systems that can 
be expanded and upgraded stand a better chance of successful implementation than systems that 
try to achieve theoretical perfection. Hong Kong and Cambridge experimented with sophisticated 
technologies and their complexity contributed to the failure of the plans to advance beyond the 
trial stage (Ison and Rye, 2005). Problems with the complex technology of the German HGV 
charge also forced the initial roll out to be aborted. Part of the problem was incompatibilities of 
the component technologies. As Noordegraaf et al. (2009) note, technologies can interact in 
unforeseen ways and assembling component technologies that have been proven in isolation may 
not result in a working overall system. 
A further lesson is that congestion pricing schemes cannot be planned once-and-for-all and 
then left alone, but need to evolve and be fine-tuned. The Singapore, London, and Stockholm 
schemes demonstrate this well. Singapore launched its Area Licensing Scheme in 1975 with a 
daily entry fee into the restricted zone that applied only in the morning.53 An evening charge was 
added in 1988. In 1994, separate permits were issued for all-day entries and entries restricted to 
the middle of the day. Paper-based licenses were replaced by electronic road pricing in 1998. 
Graduated rates to smooth the toll changes between half-hour periods were introduced in 2003. 
                                                 
52 For example, since 1996 vehicles sold in the US are equipped with a data bus called an on-Board Data 
link 2 that — in conjunction with an on-board unit — can be used to compute distance and communicate 
with a back office via SMS text messaging (Donath et al., 2009). 
53 The history of road pricing in Singapore is described in Gómez-Ibáñez and Small (1998), Santos et al. 
(2004), Christainsen (2006), and Chew (2008). 
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A gantry that operates only in the evening to toll outbound trips was set up in 2005. And, as 
discussed earlier, toll rates are adjusted quarterly to maintain target speeds. 
The main changes to the London scheme have been an increase of the charge from £5 to £8 
in 2005, and the Western Extension of the charging zone in 2007. Ken Livingstone, the former 
mayor, proposed to differentiate the charge by vehicle emissions but this was not implemented. 
The new mayor, Boris Johnson, plans to abolish the Western Extension. Travel speeds have been 
decreasing since 2005 (Transport for London, 2008). This is attributed to reallocation of road 
space away from cars to buses, taxis and bicyclists (Santos, 2008), and may prompt an increase 
in the toll or a reduction in discounts and exemptions. 
Despite its relatively short history the Stockholm charge has evolved too. As noted earlier, 
both transponders and ANPR were used for the trial but transponders were discontinued when 
the charge was made permanent. Exemptions for taxis were also eliminated. As in London, travel 
speeds have been falling. Hultkrantz and Liu (2009) provide evidence that the deterioration is 
due to a combination of rapid growth in the share of “green” cars that are exempt from the 
charge, a decision to make charges deductible from income tax, and reductions in the real value 
of toll rates. 
These developments point not only to the need for continuing appraisal of scheme design, but 
also the importance of taking into consideration other policies that may be implemented — either 
in combination with congestion pricing as part of a policy package, or independently. Congestion 
pricing schemes should be developed and implemented with a view to their broad implications 
and consistency with other policies. 
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9  TABLES 
Table 1 : Congestion pricing functions and technologies 
Technology 
Road use 
measurement 
Data communication Enforcement 
Odometer/tachograph Distance   
Dead reckoning 
 
Distance   
OCR/ANPR 
 
Location Bills sent to user by 
post, deducted from 
bank account, etc. 
√ 
DSRC Location √ √ 
GNSS (e.g. GPS) Location with GPRS  
Cellular networks Location with GPRS  
Smart cards  √  
Enforcement beacons   √ 
Enforcement 
transponders 
  √ 
Mobile monitors with 
readers 
  √ 
 
Notes: ANPR = Automatic Number Plate Recognition; DSRC = Dedicated Short Range 
Communications; GNSS = Global Navigation Satellite Systems; GPRS = General Packet Radio 
Service; GPS = Global Positioning System; OCR = Optical Character Recognition. 
 
Sources: Various 
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Table 2: Selected congestion pricing schemes and technologies 
 Coverage and  
toll 
differentiation 
Road use 
measurement 
Communications Enforcement 
HOT lanes 
SR-91/Orange 
County 
(1995) 
Scheduled. 
HOV3+ exempt 
except eastbound 
on weekdays 
4 pm -6 pm 
FasTrak 
transponder 
Transponder. 
Prepaid account 
Cameras, 
enforcement 
beacons 
I-394 
(2005) 
Responsive. 
HOV2+ exempt 
MnPass 
transponder 
Transponder. 
Prepaid account 
Enforcement 
transponders, 
mobile readers 
I-15 Managed 
lanes/San Diego 
(2009) 
Responsive. 
Distance-based. 
HOV2+ exempt 
FasTrak 
transponder 
Transponder. 
Prepaid account 
FasTrak 
smartcard 
identifies 
violators 
Area-based schemes 
Singapore 
(1998) 
Expressways & 
arterials + CBD 
+ 1 cordon. 
Scheduled. 
By road and 
vehicle type 
DSRC DSRC and IVUs 
with smartcard 
ANPR 
London 
(2003) 
Charging zone. 
Flat. 
Various 
exemptions 
ANPR Manual by 
various means 
ANPR 
Stockholm 
(2007) 
Cordon. 
Scheduled. 
Various 
exemptions 
ANPR. 
(Transponders 
for exempt 
vehicles.) 
Monthly bill with 
payment by 
various means 
ANPR 
European distance-based heavy goods vehicle schemes 
Switzerland 
(2001) 
All roads. Flat. 
By no. axles, 
emissions class, 
GVW > 3.5 tons 
Tachograph and 
smartcard 
DSRC and 
smartcard 
ANPR & DSRC 
with GPS backup
Austria 
(2004) 
Primary roads. 
Flat. By no. 
axles. GVW > 
3.5 tons 
DSRC OBUs “Go Box” Cameras 
Germany 
(2005) 
Federal 
motorways & 
GPS GSM Mobile monitors 
DSRC backup 
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some secondary 
roads. Flat. By 
no. axles, 
emissions class. 
GVW > 12 tons 
US studies of distance-based charges for passenger vehicles 
Oregon  
(2004-2006) 
Zonal. 
Scheduled 
GPS & odometer 
(no GIS) 
DSRC at gasoline 
stations 
N/A 
Puget Sound 
Regional 
Council 
(2002-2008) 
Freeways & 
major arterials. 
Scheduled. 
By road type 
GPS with OBU 
equipped with 
GIS 
Cellular N/A 
Iowa 
(2005-2010) 
Regional.  
Flat. By vehicle 
class, & road 
type eventually 
GPS with OBU 
equipped with 
GIS 
Cellular Odometer & 
dead reckoning 
backup. 
GPS validation 
 
Notes: ANPR = Automatic Number Plate Recognition; DSRC = Dedicated Short Range 
Communications; GIS = Geographical Information System; GPS = Global Positioning System; 
GSM = Global System for Mobile communications; GVW = Gross Vehicle Weight; HOV = 
High Occupancy Vehicle; IVU = In Vehicle Unit; OBU = On Board Unit. 
 
Sources: Cottingham et al. (2007), Nash et al. (2008), GINA (2009), Noordegraaf et al. (2009) 
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Table 3: Technology comparisons for distance-based charging 
 ANPR DSRC Satellite Cellular 
System type Roadside-only Tag & beacon In-vehicle only In-vehicle only 
Road use 
measurement 
ANPR On Board Unit GNSS Cellular network 
Data 
communication 
 DSRC GPRS GPRS 
Assessment criteria  
Location 
accuracy 
+ + + + + + 
Roadside 
infrastructure 
costs 
- - - - + + + + 
Vehicle 
equipment costs 
+ + - - - 
Flexibility - - + ++ ++ 
Scalability - - - - + + + + 
 
Notes: ANPR = Automatic Number Plate Recognition; DSRC = Dedicated Short Range 
Communications; GNSS = Global Navigation Satellite Systems; GPRS = General Packet Radio 
Service 
 
Source: Noordegraaf et al. (2009, Table 2) 
